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Jones v. Barlow, Case No. 20040932
Notice of Recently Issued Supplemental Authority

Dear Chief Justice and Associate Justices:
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(i), Appellee Keri Jones respectfully submits
this supplemental authority recently issued by the West Virginia Supreme Court. The decision,
In re CliffordK., — S.E.2d —, 2005 WL 1431514 (W.Va. 2005) (slip opinion enclosed as
Exhibit A), was issued last Friday, June 17, 2005.
In re Clifford K. addresses several issues similar to those raised by this case. In the West Virginia
case, a lesbian couple had a child together using artificial insemination and raised the child
together until the biological parent tragically was killed in a car accident. A trial court granted
custody of the child to the surviving partner. The trial court's holding was reversed by an
intermediate appellate court, on the ground that the partner lacked standing to seek custody. The
West Virginia Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's order, holding that the
partner had standing to seek custody as a "psychological parent" and that "the child's best
interests would best be served by awarding permanent custody of [the child]" to her. In re
Clifford K., slip op. at 46.
Several aspects of the decision are relevant to this appeal. First, the common law doctrine of
psychological parentage is very similar to lhat of in loco parentis. The key elements of the
doctrine are: "the formation of a significant relationship between a child and an adult who may
be, bui is not required to be, related to the child biologically or adoptively; a substantial temporal
duration of the relationship; the adult's assumption of caietaking duties for and provision of
emotional and financial support to the child: and. most importantly, the fostering and
encouragement of, and consent to, such relationship by the child's legal parent or guardian." Id.
at 36-37. Based on these criteria, a psychological parent ma> be "a biological, adoptne. or foster

parent, or any other person" Id. at 36 (emphasis added). The person need not have a legal or
biological relationship to the child or to the child's legal parent. Id.
Second, a person may attain the status of a psychological parent "while living in the same
household as the child and his/her legal parent or guardian." Id.
Third, the purpose of the doctrine, like that of the in loco parentis doctrine, is to protect the
bonded relationship between a child and a person who, while not a legal parent, functions as a
permanent parental figure to a child. "The primary objective . . . is to serve the child's best
interests, by facilitating . . . stability of the child . . . [and] . . . continuity of existing parent-child
relationships." Id. at 42 (quoting W.Va. Code §§ 48-9-102(a)(l, 3)). Moreover, "a child has a
right to continued association with individuals with whom he has formed a close emotional bond
. . . provided that a determination is made that such continued contact is in the best interests of
the child." Id. (citations omitted).
Fourth, in appropriate circumstances, permitting a psychological parent to seek custody or
visitation is consistent with respecting a legal parent's right to parental autonomy where "the
child's biological parent not only acquiesced in, but actively fostered, the relationship that has
developed" between the person and the child. Id. at 43. In addition, children also have a
constitutionally protected right to maintain relationships with persons with whom they have
established close parental bonds. Id. at 42.
Fifth, the court noted that its holding is consistent with that of many other jurisdictions who have
considered custody and visitation cases involving children born to same-sex couples. Id. at 38, n.
20 (citing T.B. v.L.R.M., 2000 Pa. Super. 168, 753 A.2d 873; In re Parentage ofL.B., Ill Wash.
App. 460, 89 P.3d 271); see also id. at 44, n. 23 (citing law review articles that describe other
cases involving similar facts).
Finally, due to the procedural posture of the case, the court relied on a statute addressing who
may intervene in an existing custody proceeding; nonetheless, the court noted that based on its
prior case law, a psychological parent clearly would have standing to initiate a custody action
independent of any statute. Id. at 25, n. 9 (stating that the surviving partner "could have initiated
an action to formally obtain custody of [the child] . . . because our prior case law entitles a third
party to seek a change in custody from a child's natural parent").
This case is the most recent addition to the growing body of case law from other states holding
that a person who is not a legal parent may be entitled to seek visitation or custody with a child
where the person has functioned as a parent in every respect, with the support and
encouragement of the child's legal parent, and has formed a bonded parent-child relationship, as
discussed in more detail on pages 1 5 - 2 9 of Appellee's Opposition brief.
Respectfully submitted,

Lauren R. Barros
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SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.

Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-1-232 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004), a

"legal parent" is "an individual defined as a parent, by law, on the basis of biological
relationship, presumed biological relationship, legal adoption or other recognized
grounds." The phrase "other recognized grounds" refers to those individuals or entities
who have been formally accorded parental status or the functional equivalent thereof by
way of statute or judicial decree. Such parental status is comparable to the rights and
responsibilities of a biological or adoptive parent and includes, but is not limited to, the
right to care, control, and custody of the minor child; the right to consent or object to the
child's adoption by another person; and the duty to support the child.

2.

The reference to "exceptional cases" contained in W. Va. Code § 48-

9-103(b) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) signifies unusual or extraordinary cases, and,
accordingly, a court should exercise its discretion to permit intervention in such unusual
or extraordinary cases only when intervention is likely to serve the best interests of the
subject child(ren).

3.

A psychological parent is a person who, on a continuing day-to-day

basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills a child's
psychological and physical needs for a parent and provides for the child's emotional and

i

financial support. The psychological parent may be a biological, adoptive, or foster
parent, or any other person. The resulting relationship between the psychological parent
and the child must be of substantial, not temporary, duration and must have begun with
the consent and encouragement of the child's legal parent or guardian. To the extent that
this holding is inconsistent with our prior decision of In re Brandon I.E., 183 W. Va. 113,
394 S.E.2d 515 (1990), that case is expressly modified.

4.

In exceptional cases and subject to the court's discretion, a

psychological parent may intervene in a custody proceeding brought pursuant to W. Va.
Code § 48-9-103 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) when such intervention is likely to serve the
best interests of the child(ren) whose custody is under adjudication.

u

Davis, Justice:
The appellant herein and petitioner below, Tina B.,1 appeals from an order
entered December 2, 2003, by the Circuit Court of Clay County. By the terms of that
order, the circuit court denied Tina B.'s petition for custody of the minor child, Z.B.S.,
who Tina B. had raised from infancy with her now-deceased partner, finding that Tina B.
lacked standing to seek an award of custody under W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (2001) (Repl.
Vol. 2004). Additionally, the circuit court granted temporary custody of Z.B.S. to his
maternal grandfather, the appellee herein and respondent below, Paul S. On appeal to this
Court, Tina B. complains that the circuit court erred by finding that she lacked standing
to assert her status as Z.B.S.'s psychological parent and to seek his custody in such
capacity. Upon a review of the parties' arguments, the record presented for appellate
consideration, and the pertinent authorities, we conclude that Tina B. is a proper party to
seek custody of Z.B.S. Accordingly, we reverse the contrary decision of the Clay County
Circuit Court.

!

In accordance with our practice in similar cases involving sensitive matters,
we will refer to the parties by their last initials rather than by their full surnames. See, e.g.,
In re Stephen Tyler R., 213 W. Va. 725, 729 n.l, 584 S.E.2d 581, 585 n.l (2003); Tackett
v.American Motorists Ins. Co., 213 W. Va. 524, 526 n.l, 584 S.E.2d 158, 160 n.l (2003);
In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 329 n.l, 540 S.E.2d 542, 546 n.l (2000).
1

I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts2 underlying the instant proceeding are not disputed by the parties.
Tina B. and the decedent, Christina S., began living together on approximately November
1, 1998. During the course of their relationship, Tina B. and Christina S. decided they
would like to have a child together. Thereafter, Clifford K., petitioner below, was enlisted
to help Christina S. conceive a child. Z.B.S., the biological child of Christina S. and
Clifford K., was bom on December 25, 1999, and, following his birth, Z.B.S. resided
continuously with Christina S. and Tina B. as their son.

Tragically, Christina S. died as a result of injuries she sustained in a motor
vehicle accident on June 1, 2002. On that same day, while Tina B. was still hospitalized
as a result of injuries she had sustained in the aforementioned accident, Paul S., the father
of Christina S. and the maternal grandfather of Z.B.S., assumed physical custody of the
child. Afterwards, on June 10, 2002, Paul S. sought the office of and was appointed
guardian of Z.B.S. by the Clay County Commission as a result of Christina S.'s death.
Thereafter, Clifford K. and Tina B. jointly filed a petition for custody of Z.B.S. on July
16, 2002; although Clifford K. was a party to the petition for custody, he apparently did

2

By order of this Court, entered September 16, 2004, the record in this case
has been sealed upon the request of Tina B. Accordingly, only those facts that are
essential to our consideration and determination of this matter wall be recited in this
opinion.
2

so on Tina B.'s behalf and not because he sought custody of Z.B.S. for himself.3

By Temporary Order entered September 23,2002, the Family Court of Clay
County awarded equal visitation with Z.B.S. to both Tina B. and Clifford K., and granted
Paul S. temporary custody of Z.B.S. Upon the conclusion of this hearing, a guardian ad
litem for the minor child was appointed and extensive psychological evaluations of all
parties were conducted. The guardian ad litem recommended that sole custody of Z.B.S.
be awarded to Tina B. because she is his "second mother, by design and in actuality," with
reasonable visitation by Clifford K., Paul. S., and Paul S.'s wife, who is Christina S.'s
mother and Z.B.S.'s maternal grandmother.

In light of the guardian ad litem's

recommendations and the psychological evaluations, the family court, by Final Order
entered July 25, 2003, found that "Tina B[.] has standing to seek custody of Z.B.S. as a
'psychological parent' due to the significant caretaking services she provided prior to the
death of Christin[a] S[.] and the strong parent-child bond that now exists between Tina
B[.] and Z.B.S." The court then awarded primary custody of Z.B.S. to TinaB. based upon
Tina B.'s status as the child's psychological parent and because such a placement served
the child's best interests by promoting "[t]he stability of the child and the continuity of
existing parent-child relationships."

Shared custody by way of visitation rights,

3

In fact, Clifford K. not only acquiesces in an award of custody to Tina B.;
he has not actively sought custody of his son and has chosen not to participate in the
instant appeal.
3

denominated "custodial time," was awarded to both Clifford K. and Paul S. and his wife.

Paul S. appealed the family court's adverse ruling to the Circuit Court of
Clay County. By Order of Remand entered December 2, 2003, the circuit court adopted
the family court's findings but determined, instead, that "[Tina] B[.] does not have
standing to seek custody of the infant child" under W. Va. Code § 48-9-1034 because
"[s]he is not the legal parent of Z.B.S., [and].. .the concept of'psychological parent' [has
not been extended] to include the former same sex partner of a biological parent." Based
upon this ruling, the circuit court transferred temporary custody of Z.B.S. to Paul S., and
granted visitation to Tina B. The court further remanded the case to the family court for
an award of the permanent custody of Z.B.S. to either Clifford K. or Paul S.

Following the circuit court's order awarding temporary custody of Z.B.S. to
Paul S., the family court, by order entered January 6, 2004, refused Tina B.'s motion to
stay the circuit court's order and continued custody in Paul S. Thereafter, the family
court, on remand, entered a Permanent Custody Order on March 2, 2004, recognizing the
circuit court's ruling finding that Tina B. did not have standing to seek custody of Z.B.S.;
awarding custody to Clifford K., as the natural father of Z.B.S.; and granting permanent

4

W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) establishes who may
bring or participate in proceedings seeking to establish custody of a child. For the
complete text of W. Va. Code § 48-9-103, see Section III, infra.
4

shared parenting time in the form of visitation to Paul S. and Tina B., with Tina's
parenting time to coincide with Clifford K.'s parenting time. From that order, Paul S.
appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the family court's ruling by Second Order of
Remand entered May 3, 2004, concluding that "the family court did indirectly what the
family court could not do directly which is to award petitioner, Tina B[.], custody of the
infant child, Z.B.S." The circuit court then ordered that Paul S. receive temporary custody
of Z.B.S.; awarded visitation to Tina B.; and again directed the family court to determine
whether Clifford K. or Paul S. should be granted custody of Z.B.S.

During the pendency of the family court remand proceedings and Paul S.'s
ensuing appeal to the circuit court, Tina B. petitioned this Court for appeal from the Clay
County Circuit Court's December 2, 2003, first Order of Remand which had directed the
family court to determine who, as between Clifford K. and Paul S., should be granted
permanent custody of Z.B.S. By order entered September 2,2004, this Court granted Tina
B.'s petition for appeal; stayed the circuit court's December 2, 2003, and May 3, 2004,
orders transferring custody to and maintaining custody in Paul S.; and reinstated the
family court's July 25, 2003, Final Order awarding primary custody to Tina B.

5

II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issue presented for resolution by the instant appeal is whether the
circuit court properly interpreted W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 as precluding Tina B. from
seeking custody of Z.B.S. When considering the correctness of decisions rendered by a
circuit court that were based upon a family court's ruling, we apply a multifaceted review:
In reviewing a final order entered by a circuit court
judge upon a review of, or upon a refusal to review, a final
order of a family court judge, we review the findings of fact
made by the family court judge under the clearly erroneous
standard, and the application of law to the facts under an abuse
of discretion standard. We review questions of law de novo.
Syl., Carrv. Hancock, 216 W. Va. 474, 607 S.E.2d 803 (2004). See also Syl. pt. 2, Lucas
v. Lucas, 215 W. Va. 1,592 S.E.2d 646 (2003) ("In reviewing challenges to findings made
by a family court judge that also were adopted by a circuit court, a three-pronged standard
of review is applied. Under these circumstances, a final equitable distribution order is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings are
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law and statutory
interpretations are subject to a de novo review.").

Of particular relevance to the case sub judice is our specific manner of
reviewing the correctness of orders determining child custody:
The exercise of discretion by a trial court in awarding
custody of a minor child will not be disturbed on appeal unless
6

that discretion has been abused; however, where the trial
court's ruling does not reflect a discretionary decision but is
based upon an erroneous application of the law and is clearly
wrong, the ruling will be reversed on appeal.
Syl. pt 2, Funkhouserv. Funkhouser, 158 W. Va. 964, 216 S.E.2d 570 (1975), superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in David M. v. Margaret M, 182 W. Va. 57, 385
S.E.2d 912 (1989).

Lastly, we accord plenary review to matters involving statutory
interpretation: "Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question
of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review."
Syl.pt 1, ChystalR.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138,459 S.E.2d415 (1995). Accord
Syl. pt. 1, Appalachian Power Co. v. State TaxDep'tofWest Virginia, 195 W. Va. 573,466
S.E.2d 424 (1995) ("Interpreting a statute or an administrative rule or regulation presents
a purely legal question subject to de novo review."). Mindful of these standards, we
proceed to consider the parties' arguments.

III.
DISCUSSION
On appeal to this Court, Tina B. challenges the circuit court's decision
concluding that she does not have standing to seek custody of the minor child, Z.B.S., who
has resided with her since his birth and whom she has raised and cared for, with her now-

7

deceased partner, since that time. In so ruling, the circuit court determined that Tina B.
did not meet any of the criteria enumerated in W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 so as to entitle her
to participate in Z.B.S.'s custody proceeding. Before this Court, Tina B. contends that,
as the psychological parent of the minor child, she is entitled to participate in his custody
proceeding and to seek an award of custody. By contrast, Paul S. contends that the circuit
court properly denied Tina B. custody of Z.B.S. Z.B.S., appearing by and through his
guardian ad litem, agrees with Tina B.'s contentions and suggests that his best interests
would be served by awarding his custody to Tina B. 5

At issue in this proceeding is the solitary question of whether Tina B. is
statutorily authorized to seek custody of Z.B.S. To determine this issue, it is necessary to
examine not only the statute governing which parties are entitled to participate in custody
proceedings, W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004), 6 but also those canons of
statutory construction which guide our analysis of this statutory language. The cardinal
rule of statutory interpretation is to first identify the legislative intent expressed in the

5

We note the appearance of the various Amici Curiae in this case, Jeffrey L.
Hall, Guardian ad Litem for Z.B.S.; Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.;
National Center for Lesbian Rights; Lesbian and Gay Rights Project of the American Civil
Liberties Union; and the American Civil Liberties Union of West Virginia Foundation,
and our appreciation of their participation in this proceeding.
6

W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) identifies parties to an
action allocating the custodial and decision-making responsibility of children. The full
text of this statute will be discussed infra in the body of this opinion.
8

promulgation at issue. To this end, we have recognized that "[t]he primary object in
construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." Syl.
pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen ys Comp. Comm V, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975).
We next scrutinize the specific language employed in the enactment.

"A statutory

provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will
not be interpreted by the courts but will be given foil force and effect." Syllabus point 2,
State v. Epperty, 135 W. Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d488 (1951). AccordDeVane v. Kennedy, 205
W. Va. 519, 529, 519 S.E.2d 622, 632 (1999) ("Where the language of a statutory
provision is plain, its terms should be applied as written and not construed." (citations
omitted)).

Where, however, the statute's terms are less clear, statutory construction,
rather than strict application, is appropriate. In such instances, "[jjudicial interpretation
of a statute is warranted only if the statute is ambiguous and the initial step in such
interpretative inquiry is to ascertain the legislative intent." Syl. pt. 1, Ohio County
Comm'n v. Manchin, 171 W. Va. 552, 301 S.E.2d 183 (1983). Accord Syl. pt. 1, Farley
v. Buckalew, 186 W. Va. 693, 414 S.E.2d 454 (1992) ("A statute that is ambiguous must
be construed before it can be applied."). Furthermore, statutory construction is necessary
to ascertain the meaning of undefined words and phrases.

"In the absence of any

definition of the intended meaning of words or terms used in a legislative enactment, they
will, in the interpretation of the act, be given their common, ordinary and accepted
9

meaning in the connection in which they are used." Syl. pt. 1, Miners in Gen. Group v.
Hix, 123 W. Va. 637, 17 S.E.2d 810 (1941), overruled on other grounds by Lee-Norse Co.
v. Rutledge, 170 W. Va. 162, 291 S.E.2d 477 (1982).

Applying the aforementioned analytical framework, we first consider the
Legislature's intention in enacting W. Va. Code § 48-9-103. Companion statutes to this
provision make it abundantly clear that the primary aim of this legislation is to secure
custodial placements of children that serve their best interests and to promote stability and
continuity with those parents or parental figures with whom such children have formed
an emotional attachment bond. W. Va. Code § 48-9-101(b) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004)
poignantly states that "[t]he Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of
this state to assure that the best interest of children is the court's primary concern in
allocating custodial and decision-making responsibilities between parents who do not live
together." Similarly, W. Va. Code § 48-9-102 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) enumerates
specific factors that are essential to promoting and safeguarding the best interests standard:
(a) The primary objective of this article is to serve the
child's best interests, by facilitating:
(1) Stability of the child;
(2) Parental planning and agreement about the child's
custodial arrangements and upbringing;
(3) Continuity of existing parent-child attachments;
(4) Meaningful contact between a child and each
10

parent;
(5) Caretaking relationships by adults who love the
child, know how to provide for the child's needs, and who
place a high priority on doing so;
(6) Security from exposure to physical or emotional
harm; and
(7) Expeditious, predictable decision-making and
avoidance of prolonged uncertainty respecting arrangements
for the child's care and control.
(b) A secondary objective of [this] article is to achieve
fairness between the parents.

These legislative statements of purpose also are consistent with this Court's
pronouncements identifying the best interests of the child as being the paramount
consideration by which custody determinations should be made. We repeatedly have held
that c"[i]n a contest involving the custody of an infant the welfare of the child is the polar
star by which the discretion of the court will be guided.' Point 2, Syllabus, State ex rel
Lipscomb v.Joplin, 131 W. Va. 302[,47 S.E.2d221 (1948)]." Syl.pt. 19 State ex rel Cash
v. Lively, 155 W. Va. 801, 187 S.E.2d 601 (1972). See also Syl. pt. 3, in part, In re Katie
S.9 198 W. Va. 79,479 S.E.2d 589 (1996) ("Although parents have substantial rights that
must be protected, the primary g o a l . . . in all family law matters . . . must be the health
and welfare of the children."); Syl. pt. 5, Carter v. Carter, 196 W. Va. 239,470 S.E.2d 193
(1996) ("In visitation as well as custody matters, we have traditionally held paramount the
best interests of the child."); David M. v. Margaret M, 182 W. Va. 57, 60,385 S.E.2d 912,
11

916 (1989) (The "child's welfare is the paramount and controlling factor in all custody
matters." (citations omitted)). Thus, "[t]o justify a change of child custody, in addition
to a change in circumstances of the parties, it must be shown that such change would
materially promote the welfare of the child." Syl. pt. 2, Cloud v. Cloud, 161 W. Va. 45,
239 S.E.2d 669 (1977) (per curiam).

To further promote this stated goal to safeguard the best interests of children,
the Legislature has recognized that, in certain circumstances, persons who are not a child's
parent or legal guardian might also be proper parties to a custody proceeding. In this
regard, the statute at issue in this proceeding, W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (2001) (Repl. Vol.
2004), delineates who may participate in actions involving custodial determinations by
identifying various categories of persons who have statutorily been granted permission to
participate in custodial determination actions:
(a) Persons who have a right to be notified of and
participate as a party in an action filed by another are:
(1) A legal parent of the child, as defined in section 1232 [§ 48-1-232] of this chapter;
(2) An adult allocated custodial responsibility or
decision-making responsibility under a parenting plan
regarding the child that is then in effect; or
(3) Persons who were parties to a prior order
establishing custody and visitation, or who, under a parenting
plan, were allocated custodial responsibility or decisionmaking responsibility.

12

(b) In exceptional cases the court may, in its discretion,
grant permission to intervene to other persons or public
agencies whose participation in the proceedings under this
article it determines is likely to serve the child's best interests.
The court may place limitations on participation by the
intervening party as the court determines to be appropriate.
Such persons or public agencies do not have standing to
initiate an action under this article.
W. Va. Code § 48-9-103. Of the four enumerated classes, the parties agree that neither
subsection (a)(2) nor subsection (a)(3) applies to the case sub judice insofar as no
parenting plan or custodial and visitation order has previously been entered regarding
Z.B.S. feW. Va. Code §§ 48-9-103(a)(2-3). See also W. Va. Code § 48-1-235.3 (2001)
(Repl. Vol. 2004) (defining "parenting plan").7

The parties disagree, however, as to which of the remaining subsections of
W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 is applicable to the facts at issue herein and whether the pertinent

7

W. Va. Code § 48-1-235.3 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) defines a "[pjarenting
plan" as "a temporary parenting plan as defined in subdivision (22) of this section or a
permanent parenting plan as defined in subdivision (17) of this section." Though defined
in an earlier version of the domestic relations statutes, "temporary parenting plan" is no
longer statutorily defined. However,
"[pjermanent parenting plan" means a plan for
parenting a child that is incorporated into a final order or
subsequent modification order in a domestic relations action.
The plan principally establishes, but is not limited to, the
allocation of custodial responsibility and significant decisionmaking responsibility and provisions for resolution of
subsequent disputes between the parents.
W. Va. Code § 48-1-235.4 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
13

provision permits Tina B. to participate in Z.B.S. 's custody proceeding. Tina B. contends
that she is Z.B.S.'s legal parent and thus is entitled to participate in the proceedings
pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(a)(l). By contrast, Paul S. asserts that the only
provision that could conceivably grant Tina B. permission to participate in these
proceedings is W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b) and that, even under that subsection, Tina B.
is not entitled to custody of Z.B.S. We will consider each of these arguments in turn.

A. W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(a)(I)
Tina B. contends that she is the legal parent of Z.B.S., and, thus, she is
entitled to seek his custody pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(a)(l). "Legal parent" is
defined in W. Va. Code § 48-1-232 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) as "an individual defined as
a parent, by law, on the basis of biological relationship, presumed biological relationship,
legal adoption or other recognized grounds." From this definition, Tina B. does not
qualify as Z.B.S.'s legal parent under the first two enumerated criteria because she has
neither a biological nor a presumed biological relationship with him. Furthermore, Tina
B. has not formally adopted Z.B.S. so she does not qualify as his legal parent on that basis.
The final manner in which Tina B. may qualify as the legal parent of Z.B.S. is if she has
been determined to be his parent on the basis of "other recognized grounds". W. Va. Code
§ 48-1-232. Under the facts of the instant proceeding, however, we reject Tina B.'s
argument that she meets this definition as such a construction is not contemplated by the
expressed legislative intent.
14

In stating who may be a child's "legal parent," the Legislature has left
undefined the qualification described as "other recognized grounds." See W. Va. Code
§ 48-1-232. Absent precise legislative guidance, we must defer instead to the "common,
ordinary and accepted meaning [of the terms] in the connection in which they are used."
Syl. pt. 1, in part, Miners in Gen. Group v. Hix, 123 W. Va. 637, 17 S.E.2d 810. The
customary construction of the word "recognized" is "[acknowledged, admitted; known."
VIII The Oxford English Dictionary 253 (1970 re-issue).

More specifically, to

"recognize" is "to acknowledge formally." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary
984 (9th ed. 1983). Accord Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 1611 (2d
ed. 1998) (defining "recognize" as "to acknowledge or accept formally a specified factual
or legal situation . . . to acknowledge or treat as valid"). See also Price v. United States,
100 F. Supp. 310, 316 (Ct. CI. 1951) (construing word "recognize" as meaning "to
acknowledge by admitting to a privileged status" (internal quotations and citation
omitted)). Thus, it is apparent that the Legislature's reference to "other recognized
grounds" in W. Va. Code § 48-1-232 contemplates a formal acknowledgment of parental
status or the functional equivalent thereof. A brief survey of this State's statutory law
regarding the care and custody of minor children provides several examples of the abovereferenced

"other recognized grounds" wherein the Legislature has

formally

acknowledged parental status or has recognized its functional equivalent.

For example, the Legislature has determined that, in paternity proceedings,
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a man may automatically be declared to be a child's legal father in certain circumstances.
Where there exists scientific certainty that a man is the subject child's biological father,
he is denominated as such: "Undisputed blood or tissue test results which show a
statistical probability of paternity of more than ninety-eight percent shall, when filed,
legally establish the man as the father of the child for all purposes and child support may
be established pursuant to the provisions of this chapter." W. Va. Code § 48-24-103(a)(3)
(2002) (Repl. Vol. 2004) (emphasis added). Accord Syl. pt. 5, MildredL.M. v. John O.F.,
192 W. Va. 345, 452 S.E.2d 436 (1994) ("Under W. Va. Code, 48A-6-3 (1992),
undisputed blood or tissue test results indicating a statistical probability of paternity or
more than ninety-eight percent are conclusive on the issue of paternity, and the circuit
court should enter judgment accordingly.").

Likewise, a man who acknowledges that he is the subject child's father will
be legally declared as such: "A written, notarized acknowledgment executed pursuant to
the provisions of section twelve [§ 16-5-12], article five, chapter sixteen of this code
legally establishes the man as the father of the child for all purposes and child support may
be established in accordance with the support guidelines set forth in article 13-101, et seq.
[§§ 48-13-101 et seq.]." W. Va. Code § 48-24-106 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) (emphasis
added). See also Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., Child
Support Div. v. Cline, 197 W. Va. 79, 475 S.E.2d 79 (1996) ("Absent a judicial
determination that an acknowledgment of paternity was entered into under fraud or duress,
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a written notarized acknowledgment by both the man and woman that the man is the father
of the named child legally and irrevocably establishes the man as the father of the child for
all purposes including child support obligations." (emphasis added)).

In either

circumstance, the formal recognition of paternity accords the man unrestricted parental
status as the child's legal father, accompanied by a duty to support the child and to repay
past due child support obligations. See W. Va. Code § 48-24-104 (2001) (Repl. Vol.
2004).

Additionally, the Legislature has declared that, in adoption proceedings, the
male parent of a child will be accorded "determined father" or "legal father" parental
status depending upon the circumstances surrounding such a denomination. Based upon
the nuances of a particular factual scenario, a man may be declared to be the subject
child's "[determined father":
"Determined father" means, before adoption, a person:
(1) In whom paternity has been established pursuant to the
provisions of article 24-101 etseq. [§§48-24-101 etseq.],and
section 16-5-12, whether by adjudication or achiowledgment
as set forth therein; or (2) who has been other-wise judicially
determined to be the biological father of the child entitled to
parental rights; or (3) who has asserted his paternity of the
child in an action commenced pursuant to the provisions of
article 24-101, et seq., that is pending at the time of the filing
of the adoption petition.
W. Va. Code § 48-22-109 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) (emphasis added). In other situations,
the man may be denominated as the child's "[l]egal father":
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"Legal father" means, before adoption, the male person
having the legal relationship of parent to a child: (1) Who is
married to its mother at the time of conception; or (2) who is
married to its mother at the time of birth of the child; or (3)
who is the biological father of the child and who marries the
mother before an adoption of the child.
W. Va. Code § 48-22-110 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) (emphasis added). Regardless of the
appellation that is factually appropriate in a given case, the status of both a determined
father and a legal father are accompanied by legal rights to the care and custody of the
minor child such that the consent to adoption or relinquishment of parental rights of either
a determined father or a legal father is required before his child may be adopted by another
person. See W. Va. Code §§ 48-22-301(a)(l,4) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) ("[C]onsent to
or relinquishment for adoption of a minor child is required of: (1) The parents or surviving
parent, whether adult or infant, of a marital child . . . and (4) The determined father.").

Moreover, the Legislature has recognized the functional equivalent of
parental status to exist in certain circumstances. For example, one who is appointed or
nominated as a guardian upon the death of a minor child's parent(s) is formally accorded
rights and responsibilities that are substantially the same as those that would have been
enjoyed by the child's parent(s). See W. Va. Code § 44-10-1 (1923) (Repl. Vol. 2004)
(describing "[tjestamentary guardians"); W. Va. Code § 44-10-3 (2004) (Repl. Vol. 2004)
(concemingjudicial appointment of guardian); W. Va. Code § 44-10-4 (2004) (Repl. Vol.
2004) (addressing ability of older child to nominate his/her guardian upon death of child's
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parent(s)). Under such circumstances, the guardian essentially steps into the shoes of the
deceased parent(s) to fulfill the parental role as a result of the inability of the parent(s) to
do so.

In this regard, a guardian appointed or nominated upon the death of a minor
child's parent(s) "shall have the possession, care and management of his ward's estate,
real and personal, and out of the proceeds of such estate shall provide for his maintenance
and education; and shall have also, except as otherwise provided in this article, the custody
of his ward." W. Va. Code § 44-10-7 (1996) (Repl. Vol. 2004). A guardian also
possesses legal rights to the child such that the guardian's consent is required before the
child may be adopted. See W. Va. Code § 48-22-301(d) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) ("If all
persons entitled to parental rights of the child sought to be adopted are deceased . . . then
consent or relinquishment is required of the legal guardian or any other person having
legal custody of the child at the time.").

Similarly, the Legislature has accorded the West Virginia Department of
Health and Human Resources the functional equivalent of parental status in cases
involving the abuse, neglect, and/or abandonment of a child. In such cases, "[i]t shall be
the responsibility of the state department to provide care for neglected children who are
committed to its care for custody or guardianship." W. Va. Code § 49-2-1 (1998) (Repl.
Vol. 2004).
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A child committed to the state department for
guardianship, after termination of parental rights, shall remain
in the care of the department until he attains the age of
eighteen years, or is married, or is adopted, or guardianship is
relinquished through the court.
A child committed to the state department for custody
shall remain in the care of the department until he attains the
age of eighteen years, or until he is discharged because he is
no longer in need of care.
W. Va. Code § 49-2-2 (1972) (Repl. Vol. 2004). Although a distinction has been made
between children whose guardianship, as distinguished from custody, has been committed
to the State, it is nevertheless apparent that, in both instances, the State steps into a
parental-type role insofar as it retains ultimate responsibility for the health and welfare of
the subject child.

When a child's custody has been awarded to the State, the Legislature has
additionally vested the State with sufficient legal rights to the child to require its consent
to the child's adoption if the parental rights of the child's parents' are ultimately
terminated or relinquished. Compare W. Va. Code § 49-3-l(a)(l) (2001) (Repl. Vol.
2004) ("Whenever . . . the department of health and human resources has been given the
permanent legal and physical custody of any child and the rights of the mother and the
rights of the legal, determined, putative, outside or unknown father of the child have been
terminated by order of a court of competent jurisdiction or by a legally executed
relinquishment of parental rights,... the department may consent to the adoption of the
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child pursuant to the provisions of article twenty-two [§ § 48-22-101 et seq.], chapter fortyeight of this code.") with W. Va. Code § 48-22-301(d) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) ("If all
persons entitled to parental rights of the child sought to be adopted... have been deprived
of the custody of the child by law, then consent or relinquishment is required of the legal
guardian or any other person having legal custody of the child at the time.").

" T h e Legislature, when it enacts legislation, is presumed to know its prior
enactments.' Syllabus Point 12, Vest v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (1953)."
Syl. pt. 5, Pullano v. City ofBluefield, 176 W. Va. 198, 342 S.E.2d 164 (1986). Based
upon the foregoing analysis, it is evident that our construction of the phrase "other
recognized grounds" is consistent with the Legislature's intent in employing that
terminology when it defined "legal parent" in W. Va. Code § 48-1-232 and in keeping
with the parameters of parental status, or comparable rights and responsibilities, that the
Legislature has bestowed upon individuals in certain enumerated circumstances in order
to safeguard the best interests of the children involved. Accordingly, we hold that,
pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-1-232 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004), a "legal parent" is "an
individual defined as a parent, by law, on the basis of biological relationship, presumed
biological relationship, legal adoption or other recognized grounds." The phrase "other
recognized grounds" refers to those individuals or entities who have been formally
accorded parental status or the functional equivalent thereof by way of statute or judicial
decree. Such parental status is comparable to the rights and responsibilities of a biological
21

or adoptive parent and includes, but is not limited to, the right to care, control, and custody
of the minor child; the right to consent or object to the child's adoption by another person;
and the duty to support the child.8

Applying this construction to the facts presently before us, we are unable to
accord Tina B. status as Z.B.S.'s legal parent. Her relationship with Z.B.S. does not fall
neatly into any of the categories described above in which the Legislature has specifically
bestowed parental status. Neither has Tina B. adopted Z.B.S. Most closely analogous to

8

This construction of the definition of "legal parent" is consistent with other
jurisdictions that have interpreted this term. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Simmons, 355 111.
App. 3d 942, 292 111. Dec. 47, 825 N.E.2d 303 (2005) (observing that Illinois Parentage
Act, 750 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 45/5(a)(l-2), treats husband whose wife has been artificially
inseminated as natural father of child conceived as a result of such procedure); Hernandez
v. Robles, 7 Misc. 3d 459, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 (2005) (automatically according legal parent
status to person whose spouse conceives a child with donor sperm); In re Marriage of
Wilson, 199 Or. App. 242, 246 n.l, 110 P.3d 1106, 1108 n.l (2005) (using term "legal
parent" to refer to "'natural' parents and 'adoptive' parents" as distinguished from "foster
parents, stepparents, and other nonparents" (citation omitted)); In re H.A.L., No. M200500045-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 954866 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2005) (noting that
statutory definition of "legal parent" contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-l-102(28)(D)
includes a child's biological and adoptive parents); See also Black's Law Dictionary 1137
(7th ed. 1999) ("In ordinary usage, the term ['parent'] denotes more than responsibility
for conception and birth. The term commonly includes (1) either the natural father or the
natural mother of a child, (2) the adoptive father or adoptive mother of a child, (3) a
child's putative blood parent who has expressly acknowledged paternity, and (4) an
individual or agency whose status as guardian has been established by judicial decree.").
But see Chambers v. Chambers9No. CN99-09493, 00-09295,2005 WL 645220 (Del. Fam.
Ct. Jan. 12, 2005) (determining rights of de facto parent to be on par with those of
biological or legal parent for purposes of obligation to support child conceived through
in vitro fertilization); iw re Parentage of A.B., 818N.E.2d 126,131-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)
(according legal co-parent status to same-sex partner of woman who had agreed, with
partner, to conceive child through artificial insemination).
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the case subjudice is the appointment or nomination of a guardian upon the death of the
child's parent. Unfortunately, however, there is no record evidence to support a finding
that Christina S. made such a testamentary appointment of guardianship in favor of Tina
B. Moreover, the judicial appointment of a guardian for Z.B.S. upon Christina S. 5s death
was made in favor of Paul S. While the aforementioned examples of "other recognized
grounds" are by no means the only instances in which legal parent status might be
accorded, they are indicative of a definite legislative intent to formally recognize someone
who is not biologically or adoptively related to a child as the child's functional parental
equivalent. Absent further record evidence or legal authority to support Tina B. 's claims,
we simply cannot conclude that she meets the definition of a "legal parent" set forth in
W. Va. Code § 48-1-232. Accordingly, Tina B. is foreclosed from seeking custody of
Z.B.S. pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(a)(l), which accords such standing only to
"legal parents".

B. W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (b)
Despite her inability to participate in the custodial determinations regarding
Z.B.S. as the child's legal parent, Tina B. may nevertheless still be granted permission to
intervene in such custodial proceedings if she satisfies the requirements of W. Va. Code
§ 48-9-103(b). Paul S. contends that W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b) is dispositive of the
instant controversy and that it denies Tina B. standing to seek custody of Z.B.S. We agree
with Paul S. insofar as we find subsection (b) to be determinative of the resolution of the
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matter presently before us. We disagree, however, with Paul S.'s construction of W. Va.
Code § 48-9- 103(b) as denying Tina B. the opportunity to participate in a determination
ofZ.B.S.'s custody.

W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) directs that
[i]n exceptional cases the court may, in its discretion,
grant permission to intervene to other persons or public
agencies whose participation in the proceedings under this
article it determines is likely to serve the child's best interests.
The court may place limitations on participation by the
intervening party as the court determines to be appropriate.
Such persons or public agencies do not have standing to
initiate an action under this article.
In other words, a person may, subject to the exercise of the court's discretion, intervene
in a proceeding adjudicating custody if the facts of the particular case warrant such
intervention and if the intervention is likely to promote the best interests of the subject
child(ren). See W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b).

At this juncture, we feel it is necessary to address the procedural manner in
which the case sub judice was initiated in the Family Court of Clay County. Paul S.
complains that, because Tina B. joined in the filing of this lawsuit with Clifford K., she
is not now entitled to participate in these proceedings as an intervenor. While we
appreciate the less-than-perfect procedural posture of this case, we do not think this
imperfect style of pleading disentitles Tina B. to participate in these proceedings.
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Under subsection (b) of W. Va. Code § 48-9-103, if the facts of the case and
the best interests of Z.B.S. so warrant, Tina B. could be granted permission to intervene
in a suit seeking his custody, but, pursuant to the plain statutory language, she could not
initiate such an action herself. See W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b). Nevertheless, the instant
proceeding was initiated by both Clifford K. and Tina B. as joint petitioners, rather than
having been filed by Clifford K. with Tina B. moving to intervene therein. This
procedural posture is not fatal to our consideration of the matter, however, because the
family court has cured this defect by apparently treating Tina B. 's petition as a motion for
intervention and finding that she is a proper party to these proceedings. Arguably, it
would have been preferable for Clifford K. to have filed the underlying custody
proceeding and for Tina B. to have moved to intervene in that case pursuant to the plain
language of W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b).9 However, u[w]e decline to delay the resolution
of these pivotal issues on technical procedural grounds, particularly because all necessary
parties appear to be before the court." Zikos v. Clark, 214 W. Va. 235, 241, 588 S.E.2d

Alternatively, Tina B. could have initiated an action to formally obtain
custody of Z.B.S. from Clifford K. because our prior case law entitles a third party to seek
a change in custody from a child's natural parent. See Syl. pt. 1, Overfieldv. Collins, 199
W. Va. 27,483 S.E.2d 27 (1996) ("Any attempt by a non-parent to judicially change the
care and custody of a child from a natural parent must precede that attempt with: (1) the
filing of a petition setting forth all of the reasons why the change of custody is required;
and (2) the service of that petition, together with a reasonable notice as to the time and
place that petition will be heard. Following the filing and service of the petition and
notice of hearing upon that petition, the natural parents whose rights are being affected
shall have the right to: (1) present evidence as to the reasons why custody should not be
changed; and (2) obtain a decision from a neutral, detached person or tribunal.").
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400, 406 (2003) (per curiam). Furthermore, we previously have stated that "'a mere
procedural technicality does not take precedence over the best interests of the child[.]'"
In re Erica C, 214 W. Va. 375, 380, 589 S.E.2d 517, 522 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting//?
re Tyler Z)., 213 W. Va. 149, 160, 578 S.E.2d 343, 354 (2003) (per curiam)). In short, we
refuse to elevate form over substance when the family court has found that Tina B. was
a proper party to the proceedings commenced in that tribunal. See May v. May, 214
W. Va. 394, 399 n.10, 589 S.E.2d 536, 541 n.10 (2003) ("The distinctions elevate form
over substance and do not affect the ultimate outcome[.]"); Brooks v. Isinghood, 213
W. Va. 675, 684, 584 S.E.2d 531, 540 (2003) (observing importance of "insuring] that
cases and controversies be determined upon their merits and not upon legal technicalities
or procedural niceties" (internal quotations, citation, and footnote omitted)); Dunlap v.
Friedman's, Inc., 213 W. Va. 394, 399, 582 S.E.2d 841, 846 (2003) (Davis, J., dissenting)
(noting that a conclusion which "elevates form over substance . . . defies common
statutory construction" (internal quotations and citation omitted)). Consequently, we, too,
will treat Tina B. as if she had intervened in the lower court proceedings pursuant to
W. Va. Code § 48-9- 103(b) and now consider whether that statutory language entitles her
to do so.

Turning back to the statutory requirements for one to be accorded permission
to intervene in a custody determination proceeding, then, it is apparent that if Tina B. can
demonstrate that the facts surrounding Z.B.S.'s custodial determination are such as to be
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"exceptional," she would, subject to the court's discretion and the best interests of Z.B.S.,
be entitled to intervene in such proceedings. See W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b). As with our
prior analysis of the meaning of "other recognized grounds," however, the Legislature has
left undefined "exceptional cases".

In custodial proceedings, the Legislature has reserved the right to participate
therein to a child's parents and custodians and to certain other persons who are permitted
to intervene in specific cases. See W. Va. Code §§ 48-9-103(a-b). Identifying those other
persons and/or entities who may intervene, the Legislature has specified that their
intervention is appropriate in "exceptional cases". See W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b).
Absent a statutory definition of "exceptional cases," we must necessarily defer to the
"common, ordinary and accepted meaning [of the terms] in the connection in which they
are used." Syl. pt. 1, in part, Miners in Gen. Group v. Hix, 123 W. Va. 637,17 S.E.2d 810.
The word "exceptional" is defined as "[t]he rare - the unusual or extraordinary case or
circumstance." Ballentine's Law Dictionary 426 (3d ed. 1969) (citation omitted). Accord
Chambers 20th Century Dictionary 438 (1983) (interpreting "exceptional" as "unusual");
Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 674 (2d ed. 1998) (stating that
"exceptional" is "forming an exception or rare instance; unusual; extraordinary");
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 432 (9th ed. 1983) (defining "exceptional"
as "forming an exception: rare"). Stated otherwise, "exceptional" has been construed to
mean "[o]f the nature of or forming an exception; out of the ordinary course, unusual,
27

special." Ill The Oxford English Dictionary 374 (1969 re-issue). Accord Webster's Third
New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 791 (1970)
(understanding "exceptional" as "forming an exception; usu: being out of the ordinary:
uncommon, rare"). From these definitions of "exceptional," it is apparent that the
Legislature intended to permit intervention in custodial proceedings only in unusual or
extraordinary cases. Therefore, we hold that the reference to "exceptional cases"
contained in W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) signifies unusual or
extraordinary cases, and, accordingly, a court should exercise its discretion to permit
intervention in such unusual or extraordinary cases only when intervention is likely to
serve the best interests of the subject child(ren).10 We believe that the factual predicate
of the case subjudice presents the unusual and extraordinary circumstances contemplated
by the legislative intent of W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b).

In this case, we are faced with the unique situation of a child who, since his
birth, has lived in a nontraditional household and who has more than the customary
number of parental figures in his young life. On the one hand are the biological parents

At least one other court has similarly construed an "exceptional case"
requirement in the context of child custody matters to warrant a case-by-case factual
determination based upon the best interests of the child(ren) involved. See In re Marriage
of Williams, 32 Kan. App. 2d 842,
, 90 P.3d 365, 370 (2004) ("Perhaps it is best that
neither statutory law nor case precedent provides a definition for 'exceptional case.' The
determination is too important to be subjected to a mechanical application of an artificial
litmus test containing three factors or two prongs.").
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of Z.B.S., Christina S., his now-deceased biological mother, and Clifford K.5 his biological
father, who initiated the underlying custody action but who does not wish to assume
custody of Z.B.S. On the other hand is Tina B., who has resided continuously with Z.B.S.
since his birth and who has cared for and treated him as if he were her own biological
child. As a result of the deep attachment and emotional bonds that have mutually arisen
between Tina B. and Z.B.S., Tina B. characterizes herself as the child's psychological
parent. Although we previously have recognized the concept of a psychological parent
in our jurisprudence, we have never formally defined it. In order to ascertain whether Tina
B. is Z.B.S.'s psychological parent and what effect, if any, such status would have upon
her ability to intervene in these custodial proceedings, it is necessary first to gain a better
understanding of the nature and scope of psychological parent status.

We first recognized the notion of a psychological parent in the case of State
ex rel McCartney v. Nuzwn, 161 W. Va. 740, 248 S.E.2d 318 (1978), overruled on other
grounds by In re Katie S.9 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996). In that case, we
recognized that "in certain instances psychological testimony would . . . be relevant in
aiding the determination of who should have custody of a child." 161 W. Va. at 744 n.3,
248 S.E.2d at 320 n.3 (citation omitted). However we declined to award custody to the
psychological parent in that case because we previously had determined the child's natural
mother to be entitled to her custody. See McCartney v. Coberly, 250 S.E.2d 777 (W. Va.
1978), overruled on other grounds by Overfieldv. Collins, 199 W. Va. 27, 483 S.E.2d 27
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(1996).

Our next consideration of psychological parent status was in Honaker v.
Burnside, 182 W. Va. 448, 388 S.E.2d 322 (1989). Honaker involved a custodial contest
between a child's natural father and her stepfather, with whom she had resided since she
was just over one year old. In recognizing that a gradual transition of custody from the
stepfather to the natural father was warranted, we observed with respect to the child's
longtime residence with her stepfather and half-brother that "[t]hese familial surroundings
are the only ones she has ever known, and it is undisputed that she has developed a close
and loving relationship with her stepfather." 182 W. Va. at 450, 388 S.E.2d at 323. Thus,
by recognizing the significant role her stepfather had played in the child's life as her
psychological parent, we accorded visitation privileges to him, as well as to the child's
half-brother, despite the ultimate award of the child's custody to her biological father.

The following year we again revisited the concept of a psychological parent
in the case of In re Brandon I.E., 183 W. Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515 (1990). In Brandon,
we were called upon to ascertain which court possessed jurisdiction to decide the fate of
a child embroiled in a bitter custody dispute between his biological father, with whom he
had had infrequent contact, and his maternal grandmother, who had participated in his
upbringing since his birth and who was, at the time of the proceedings, serving as his
primary caretaker.

During the course of our deliberations, we acknowledged that
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psychological parent status is entitled to consideration in appropriate cases:
If a child has resided with an individual other than a
parent for a significant period of time such that the non-parent
with whom the child resides serves as the child's
psychological parent, during a period when the natural parent
had the right to maintain continuing substantial contact with
the child and failed to do so, the equitable rights of the child
must be considered in connection with any decision that would
alter the child's custody. To protect the equitable rights of a
child in this situation, the child's environment should not be
disturbed without a clear showing of significant benefit to
him, notwithstanding the parent's assertion of a legal right to
the child.
Syl. pt. 4, In re Brandon, 183 W. Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515.

Thereafter, in Ortner v. Pritt, 187 W. Va. 494, 419 S.E.2d 907 (1992) (per
curiam), we considered who, as between the child's biological mother, with whom the
child had resided only sporadically, and the child's paternal grandmother, with whom the
child had lived for over half of his young life, was entitled to custody. We found the
grandmother had become the child's psychological parent and awarded custody to her,
instead of to the child's biological mother, because such a custodial placement was found
to be in the child's best interests. We did not, however, expound upon the law of
psychological parent status or further clarify that term.

In 1993, we decided Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350, 438 S.E.2d 530
(1993). Simmons involved a concept that is remarkably similar to that of psychological
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parent status: the functioning father. Under the facts of that case, we determined that
where a putative father has developed a strong relationship with a child and served as the
child's functioning father, he may later have standing to seek custody of the child as
against the child's a biological mother.
Where a biological mother is married to the putative
father or, although not married, advises him that he is the
biological father and he marries her, he may have standing
through the doctrine of equitable estoppel to assert a right to
custody of the child. In order to maintain his claim of
custody, the putative father must demonstrate that he has
developed a caring relationship to the child such that he has
become a functioning father. He will also have the benefit of
the primary caretaker presumption if the facts so warrant.
Syl. pt. 5, Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350, 438 S.E.2d 530. In order to attain such
status, the putative father must demonstrate that he has a significant parental relationship
with the child.
A nonbiological father must show a caring father-child
relationship, which means not only providing for the financial
support of the child, but also emotional and psychological
support. The relationship must have begun with the consent
of the biological mother. It must not have been temporary and
there must have been sufficient time for the nonbiological
father to become the functioning father.
Syl. pt. 6, Simmons, 190 W. Va. 350, 438 S.E.2d 530.

Defining the concept of

"functioning father," we recognized that the duration of the relationship between the child
and the functioning father "assists a court's determination as to the extent of the child's
bond with the functioning father." Id., 190 W. Va. at 359, 438 S.E.2d at 539 (citations
omitted). An additional consideration is "'the need for consent to ensure that the existing
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legal parent has cooperated with or encouraged a man to assume a parenting role[.]'" Id.,
190 W. Va. at 359 n.14, 438 S.E.2d at 539 n.14 (quoting J.H. Anderson, The Functioning
Father: A Unified Approach to Paternity Determinations, 30 J. Fam. L. 847, 865-67
(1992)).

We also stated in Simmons that "[w]e believe the principle of a functioning
father is consistent with our previous cases and, particularly, In Interest ofBrandon L.E.,
183 W. Va. 113,394 S.E.2d 515 (1990), where we used the term 'psychological parent.'"
190 W. Va. at 360,438 S.E.2d at 540 (footnote omitted). Recognizing this similarity, we
further acknowledged that
"[a] psychological parent is one who, on a continuing,
day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship,
interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological
needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs. The
psychological parent may be a biological,... adoptive, foster,
or common-law . . . parent, or any other person. There is no
presumption in favor of any of these after the initial
assignment at birth[.]"
190 W. Va. at 360 n. 15, 438 S.E.2d at 540 n. 15 (quoting Joseph Goldstein et al, Beyond
the Best Interests of the Chi!d98 (1979)). Accord Overfield v. Collins, 199 W. Va. 27, 37
n.8, 483 S.E.2d 27, 37 n.8 (1996).11

1

Although we acknowledged the existence of the psychological parent
concept in Overfield v. Collins, 199 W. Va. 27, 483 S.E.2d 27 (1996), further discussion
of the facts and law of that case is not instructive to our present analysis. In summary,
Overfield involved the transfer of custody from a biological mother to the children's
(continued...)
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Most recently, mln re Jonathan G., 198 W. Va. 716,482 S.E.2d 893 (1996),
we considered the role that foster parents may play in abuse and neglect proceedings in
view of the significant relationship they have developed with the child for whom they
have cared. We concluded that, as a result of the bonds that have formed, foster parents
are, subject to the court's discretion, entitled to participate in such proceedings. In this
regard, we held that "[t]h© level and type of participation [by the foster parents] in such
cases is left to the sound discretion of the circuit court with due consideration of the length
of time the child has been cared for by the foster parents and the relationship that has
developed[.]" Syl. pt. 1, in part, id. We ultimately concluded that, as a result of the strong
emotional attachment the child had to the foster parents, who had served as his custodians
from the time he was ten months old until he was over four years old, they were entitled
to visitation with the child, provided such visitation was in the boy's best interests.

From our prior decisions, we can glean several common threads as to the
meaning of psychological parent status, both from our specific recognition of this term and
from our cases involving persons who have not been specifically denominated as
psychological parents but who nevertheless have established such a meaningful

11

(...continued)
maternal grandparents, and our law of the case sought to clarify the procedures to be
followed when such a custodial transfer occurs. Insofar as Christina S. did not transfer
custody of Z.B.S. to any party before her death, the holdings of Overfield are inapplicable
to the case subjudice. See generally Syl. pts. 1-6, Overfield, 199 W. Va. 27, 483 S.E.2d
27.
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relationship with a minor child so as to be entitled to greater protection under the law than
would ordinarily be afforded to one who is not the biological or adoptive parent of the
child. Stitching together these common threads, we find that the most crucial components
of the psychological parent concept are the formation of a significant relationship between
a child and an adult,12 who may be, but is not required to be, related to the child
biologically or adoptively;13 a substantial temporal duration of the relationship;14 the
adult's assumption of caretaking duties for and provision of emotional and financial
support to the child;15 and, most importantly, the fostering and encouragement of, and

12

See, e.g., Syl. pt. 1, in part, In re Jonathan G., 198 W. Va. 716,482 S.E.2d
893 (1996); Overfieldv. Collins, 199 W. Va. 27,37 n.8,483 S.E.2d 27,37 n.8 (1996); Syl.
pts. 5-6, in part, Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350, 438 S.E.2d 530 (1993); Ortner v.
Pritt, 187 W. Va. 494, 419 S.E.2d 907 (1992) (per curiam); In re Brandon L.E., 183
W. Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515 (1990); Honaker v. Burnside, 182 W. Va. 448, 450, 388
S.E.2d 322, 323(1989).
u

See, e.g., Syl. pt. 1, in part, In re Jonathan, 198 W. Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d
893; Overfieldv. Collins, 199 W. Va. at 37 n.8,483 S.E.2d at 37 n.8; Syl. pts. 5-6, in part,
Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350,438 S.E.2d 530; Ortner v. Pritt, 187 W. Va. 494,419
S.E.2d 907; In re Brandon, 183 W. Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515; Honaker v. Burnside, 182
W. Va. at 450, 388 S.E.2d at 323.
]4

See, e.g., Syl. pt. 1, in part, In re Jonathan, 198 W. Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d
893; Overfield v. Collins, 199 W. Va. at 37 n.8, 483 S.E.2d at 37 n.8; Syl. pt. 6, in part,
Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350,438 S.E.2d 530; Ortner v. Pritt, 187 W. Va. 494,419
S.E.2d 907; Syl. pt. 4, in part, In re Brandon, 183 W. Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515; Honaker
v. Burnside, 182 W. Va. at 450, 388 S.E.2d at 323.
ls

See, e.g., Overfieldv. Collins, 199 W. Va. at 37 n.8, 483 S.E.2d at 37 n.8;
Syl. pts. 5-6, Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350, 438 S.E.2d 530; Ortner v. Pritt, 187
W. Va. 494, 419 S.E.2d 907; In re Brandon, 183 W. Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515.
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consent to, such relationship by the child's legal parent or guardian.16 Moreover, our prior
decisions suggest that one may attain psychological parent status either while living in the
same household as the child and his/her legal parent or guardian17 or while residing with
the child in the absence of the child's legal parent or guardian.18 Accordingly, we hold
that a psychological parent is a person who, on a continuing day-to-day basis, through
interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills a child's psychological and
physical needs for a parent and provides for the child's emotional and financial support.
The psychological parent may be a biological, adoptive, or foster parent, or any other
person. The resulting relationship between the psychological parent and the child must
be of substantial, not temporary, duration and must have begun with the consent and
encouragement of the child's legal parent or guardian. To the extent that this holding is
inconsistent with our prior decision of In re BrandonL.E., 183 W. Va. 113,394 S.E.2d515
(1990), that case is expressly modified.19

u

See, e.g., Syl. pts. 5-6, in part, Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350, 438

S.E.2d530.
11

See, e.g., Syl. pt. 5, in part, Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350,438 S.E.2d
530; Honaker v. Burnside, 182 W. Va. at 450, 388 S.E.2d at 323.
n

See, e.g., Syl. pt. 1, in part, In re Jonathan, 198 W. Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d
893; Ortnerv.Pritt, 187 W. Va. 494, 419 S.E.2d 907; In re Brandon, 183 W. Va. 113,394
S.E.2d515.
19

This holding is in line with other courts that have defined "psychological
parent" or discussed the similar concepts of "de facto parent" status or "in loco parentis".
See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 319 N.J. Super. 103, 725 A.2d 13 (1999), aff'd, 163 N J . 200, 748
A.2d 539 (2000); LB. v. L.R.M., 2000 Pa. Super. 168, 753 A.2d 873, appeal granted, 568
(continued...)
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With the announcement of this holding we also wish to make it abundantly
clear that the mere existence of a psychological parent relationship, in and of itself, does
not automatically permit the psychological parent to intervene in a proceeding to
determine a child's custody pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-9- 103(b). Nothing is more
sacred or scrupulously safeguarded as a parent's right to the custody of his/her child.
In the law concerning custody of minor children, no
rule is more firmly established than that the right of a natural
parent to the custody of his or her infant child is paramount to
that of any other person; it is a fundamental personal liberty
protected and guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the
West Virginia and United States Constitutions.
Syl. pt. 1, In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973). Accord Syl., Whiteman v.
Robinson, 145 W. Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691 (1960) ("A parent has the natural right to the
custody of his or her infant child, unless the parent is an unfit person because of
misconduct, neglect, immorality, abandonment or other dereliction of duty, or has waived
such right, or by agreement or otherwise has transferred, relinquished or surrendered such
custody, the right of the parent to the custody of his or her infant child will be recognized
and enforced by the courts."). See also Honaker, 182 W. Va. at 452, 388 S.E.2d at 325
(stating that "[ajlthough we recognize the attachment and secure relationship" between the
child and her psychological parent stepfather, "such bond cannot alter the otherwise secure

19

(... continued)
Pa. 667, 795 A.2d 979 (2000) (unpublished table decision), affd, 567 Pa. 222, 786 A.2d
913 (2001); In re Parentage of LB., 121 Wash. App. 460, 89 P.3d 271, review granted, 152
Wash. 2d 1013, 101 P.3d 107 (2004) (unpublished table decision). ButseeB.F. v. T.D.,
No. 2004-CA-000083-ME, 2005 WL 857093 (Ky. Ct App. Apr. 15, 2005).
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natural rights of a parent," namely the child's biological father). But see Syl. pt. 6, in part,
Lemleyv,Barr, 176 W. Va. 378, 343 S.E.2dl01 (1986) ('The law does not recognize any
absolute right in any person or claimant to the custody of a child."); Syl. pt. 3, in part,
State ex rel Lipscomb v. Joplin, 131 W. Va. 302, 47 S.E.2d 221 (1948) ("[T]he court is in
no case bound to deliver the child into the custody of any claimant and may permit it to
remain in such custody as its welfare at the time appears to require."). For this reason, the
limited rights of a psychological parent cannot ordinarily trump those of a biological or
adoptive parent to the care, control, and custody of his/her child. Nonetheless, as we have
alluded to throughout the course of this opinion, the case we presently have before us does
not comport with the usual facts attending a custodial determination under W. Va. Code
§ 48-9-101, et seq. Consequently, we hold that, in exceptional cases and subject to the
court's discretion, a psychological parent may intervene in a custody proceeding brought
pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) when such intervention is
likely to serve the best interests of the child(ren) whose custody is under adjudication.20

Applying these principles to the case sub judice, we first must determine
whether Tina B. is Z.B.S.'s psychological parent. Without a doubt, she is. From the
moment of his birth, Tina B. resided in Christina S. 's household with Z.B.S. and parented

20

This decision accords with our sister jurisdictions who have permitted a
psychological parent to participate in custody proceedings. See, e.g., T.B. v. L.R.M., 2000
Pa. Super. 168, 753 A.2d 873; In re Parentage ofL.B., 121 Wash. App. 460, 89 P.3d 271.
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him as if he were her own biological child. Although Christina S. was the child's primary
caretaker, Tina B. nevertheless also attended to his needs and provided financial as well
as emotional support for the child. In fact, the circuit court, adopting the findings of the
family court, specifically so found:
The evidence shows that Tina B[.] and Christina S[.]
planned the birth of Z.B.S. and enlisted the involvement of
Clifford K[.] only for the purpose of impregnating Christina
S[.] It was their apparent intention together to raise Z.B.S
as a "family" unit . . . . [A] strong parent-child bond exists
between Z.B.S. and Tina B[J
Apparently no relationship existed between Clifford
K[.] and Christina S[.] before conception of Z.B.S. Although
he has had contact with Z.B.S. since the child's birth, he has
performed limited care-giving functions and his planned as
well as actual involvement with the child has been limited.
Clifford K[.] would not have soughtprimary custody of Z.B.S.
but for the death of Christina D. S[.] in June 2002. The bond
between Clifford Kf.J and Z.B.S. is not as strong as the bond
between Z.B.S. and Tina Bf.J

Prior to the death of Christina S[.] on June 1, 2002,
Christina S[.] was the primary custodian and caretaker of
Z.B.S. and of the parties to this matter, Tina B [J provided the
most caretaking services to Z.B.S. prior to June 1, 2002.
(Emphasis added). The circuit court also noted that "the child resided with the biological
mother and [Tina] B[.] from birth until the biological mother's untimely death, when the
child was approximately two and a half years old."

These findings are further supported by the recommendations of the child's
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guardian ad litem, who similarly observed that
as an intended consequence of their intimate relationship, Tina
and Chris [Christina S.] enlisted the assistance of the
Petitioner Clifford K[.] (hereafter "Cliff") to impregnate Chris,
so that Tina and Chris could have a child "together." . . .
In April, 1999, Chris's pregnancy was confirmed. . . .
From April, 1991 until December, 1999, Tina
accompanied Chris to almost all prenatal medical
appointments. Z[.B.S.] was born on December 25, 1999. . . .
Tina, Chris, and Z[.B.S.] . . . continued to reside together in
Clay County as a family unit.
. . . Tina kept Z[.B.S.] the vast majority of the time
after his first year of life while Chris was at work. . . .
. . . [A] significant bond and affection exists between
Tina and Z[.B.S.] . . .

But for Chris' tragic death in June of 2002, . . . Chris
and Tina would have continued to raise Z[.B.S.] as they had
from his birth on December 25, 1999 until June 1, 2002. . . .
. . . [Tina B.] has been Z.[B.S.]'s psychological parent
since the date of his birth on December 25, 1999. She, along
with Chris (until her death), has lived with Z[.B.S.] since his
birth and she has performed all of the traditional caretaking
functions of a parent as well as having financially supported
him during his life. And the fact that she served as Z[.B.S.] 's
parent was not by accident. Rather, it was by design, and by
the agreement of Chris, Cliff, and Tina.
. . . Z[.B.S.] has clearly resided with Tina for a
significant period of time such that Tina (by design and in
practice) served as Z[.B.S.]'s psychological parent....
. . . Tina was and is Z.[B.S.]'s second mother, by
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design and in actuality. . . .
Thus, there unquestionably exists a relationship of significant duration between Tina B.
and Z.B.S. in which Tina B. has provided for the physical, psychological, financial, and
emotional needs of Z.B.S. and such that the child regards Tina B. as a parental figure in
his life.

Moreover, Christina S. not only consented to the formation of this strong
relationship between Tina B. and Z.B.S.; Christina S. actively fostered and nurtured this
bond. In the same manner, Clifford K. also acquiesced in the development of secure ties
between Z.B.S. and Tina B., and, like Christina S., purposefully encouraged such a
familial relationship. Having satisfied the above-enumerated criteria, we are convinced
that Tina B. is the psychological parent of Z.B.S.

Having established Tina B.'s relationship to the subject child, we next must
determine whether her status as a psychological parent entitles her to intervene in
proceedings seeking a determination of his custody.

Under the unique facts and

circumstances of this case, we agree with the family court's conclusion that Tina B. is a
proper party to these proceedings and disagree with the contrary decision reached by the
circuit court. Although we caution that not every psychological parent is, by virtue of
such status, entitled to intervene in custodial proceedings pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-9103(b), the very unusual and extraordinary facts of this case warrant extending that
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privilege to Tina B. Not only do the facts support such a finding herein, but the best
interests of the subject child demand such a result. The best interests of Z.B.S. also
militate in favor of an award of custody to Tina B., consistent with the result obtained by
the Family Court of Clay County.

At the forefront of our decision is the counsel of the Legislature that the aim
of the governing statute is to secure the best interests of the children whose custody is to
be determined and to promote stability and certainty in their young lives. "The primary
objective of this article is to serve the child's best interests, by facilitating . . . [stability
of the child... [and]... [cjontinuity of existing parent-child attachments [.]" W. Va. Code
§§ 48-9-102(a)(l,3). This appreciation for stability in a child's life has also been a
frequent refrain of this Court. "[Stability in a child's life is a major concern when
formulating custody arrangements." Snyder v. Scheerer, 190 W. Va. 64,72-73,436 S.E.2d
299,307-08 (1993) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Therefore, "in cases where a child has
been in one home for a substantial period, '[h]is environment and sense of security should
not be disturbed without a clear showing of significant benefit to him.'" In re Brandon,
183 W. Va. at 121, 394 S.E.2d at 523 (quoting Lemley v. Barr, 176 W. Va. 378, 386, 343
S.E.2d 101, 110 (1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted)). We would be remiss
if we did not also reiterate that "[a] child has rights, too, some of which are of a
constitutional magnitude." Lemley, 176 W. Va. at 386, 343 S.E.2d at 109 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Among these, "[a] child has a right to continued
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association with individuals with whom he has formed a close emotional bond . . .
provided that a determination is made that such continued contact is in the best interests
of the child." Syl.pt. 11, inpart, In re Jonathan, 198 W. Va. 716,482 S.E.2d 893. Accord
Snyder v. Scheerer, 190 W. Va. at 72,436 S.E.2d at 307 (recognizing "the right of a child
to continued association with those individuals to whom the child has formed an
attachment"). In this regard, "[t]he length of time that the child has remained with [such
individual(s)] is a significant factor to consider in determining this issue." In re Jonathan,
198 W. Va. at 736 n.41, 482 S.E.2d at 913 n.41.

The tragic events that have led to the circumstances in which Z.B.S.
currently finds himself have resulted in litigation over his permanent custodial placement
only because too many people love this little boy. Oh that all of the children whose fates
we must decide would be so fortunate as to be too loved. That said, it is now up to this
Court to ascertain whether the family court correctly determined that Z.B.S.'s best
interests would be served by awarding his custody to Tina B. First and foremost, we have
determined that Tina B. is Z.B.S.'s psychological parent, with all the bonds, attachments,
caretaking functions, and responsibilities that such status entails. In reaching this decision,
we have found that both of the child's biological parents not only acquiesced in, but
actively fostered, the relationship that has developed between Tina B. and Z.B.S.

We also are persuaded by the current situation into which the child has been
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thrust upon the tragic death of his mother: the other parental figure with whom he has
continuously resided, Tina B., is eager to legally assume his custody and to continue
attending to his daily needs, and his biological father, his sole surviving legal parent,
readily agrees and enthusiastically consents to such an arrangement. To reunite Tina B.
and Z.B.S. through a formal custodial arrangement would be to secure the familial
environment to which the child has become accustomed and to accord parental status to
the adult he already views in this capacity. Simply stated, an award of custody to Tina B.,
having found no indication that she is unfit21 to serve as the minor's custodian, would
promote Z.B.S.'s best interests by allowing continuity of care by the person whom he
currently regards as his parent and would thus provide stability and certainty in his life.22
See Syl. pt. 11, In re Jonathan, 198 W. Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d 893; In re Brandon, 183
W. Va. at 121, 394 S.E.2d at 523; Lemley v. Barr, 176 W. Va. at 386, 343 S.E.2d at 110.23

In fact, the guardian ad litem specifically addressed this point and stated
that "no party [has] raised any parental fitness issue regarding Tina's shared upbringing
ofZ[.B.S.]"
22

We emphasize, though, that if Clifford K. had substantially participated in
Z.B.S.'s upbringing, expressed an interest in obtaining custody of his biological son, and
actively participated in the instant proceedings, barring a finding that Clifford K. is unfit,
a different result might have been reached as to the custodial placement most befitting the
best interests of Z.B.S.
23

For decisions of other courts who have considered cases involving facts
similar to those presented by the case subjudice see generally Robin Cheryl Miller, Child
Custody and Visitation Rights Arising from Same-Sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R.5th 1 (2000).
See also Nancy G. Maxwell & Caroline J. Forder, The Inadequacies in U.S. and Dutch
Adoption Law to Establish Same-Sex Couples as Legal Parents: A Call for Recognizing
Intentional Parenthood, 38 Fam. L.Q. 623 (2004).
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While we applaud the efforts of the maternal grandparents of Z.B.S. to
secure his guardianship upon his mother's death to ensure that his care, custody, and
control would not be left to chance, their rights to and relationship with Z.B.S., while
significant and substantial, simply are not on par with those of Tina B. under the facts and
circumstances of this case. Cf. Rozas v. Rozas, 176 W. Va. 235,238, 342 S.E.2d 201, 205
(1986) ("Absent a showing that a natural parent is unfit, a natural parent's right to custody
outstrips that of a grandparent." (citations omitted)); Leach v. Bright, 165 W. Va. 636,63 8,
270 S.E.2d 793, 794 (1980) (per curiam) ("The law in this jurisdiction has long been that
the fit natural parent's right to custody of his or her child is paramount to that of any third
party, including a grandparent." (citation omitted)). See also Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel David
Allen B. v. Sommerville, 194 W. Va. 86,459 S.E.2d 363 (1995) (holding that, with regard
to establishment of paternity, rights of grandparent are more limited than those of alleged
biological parent); Frame v. Wehn, 120 W. Va. 208, 212, 197 S.E. 524, 526 (1938)
(finding that rights of grandparents were not coextensive with those of parents in
guardianship proceedings).

For these reasons, then, we find that Tina B. was entitled to participate in
Z.B.S. 's custodial proceedings. Accordingly, we reverse the December 2, 2003, ruling of
the Clay County Circuit Court which denied Tina B. permission to participate in Z.B.S.'s
custodial determination. Furthermore, remanding this case for additional proceedings to
determine Z.B.S.'s permanent custody would be futile. The family court has consistently
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held that the best interests of Z.B.S. dictate that his custody be awarded to Tina B.5 which
finding is consistent with the guardian ad litem's recommendations and the psychological
evidence presented below. Moreover, the circuit court has adopted these findings of fact
in rendering its decision in this matter which differs from the conclusions of the family
court solely on the basis of the application of the law to the facts of this case. From our
consideration of this matter, we agree with the family court's assessment of the evidence
and the circuit court's adoption of those findings. Simply stated, the child's best interests
would best be served by awarding permanent custody of Z.B.S. to Tina B. Thus, we
reinstate the July 25, 2003, decision of the Clay County Family Court awarding custody
of the minor child Z.B.S. to Tina B.24

In closing, we wish to restate a cautionary admonition we first intimated in
Honaker v. Burnside, 182 W. Va. 448, 388 S.E.2d 322 (1989), and later reiterated in
Overfieldv. Collins, 199 W. Va. 27, 483 S.E.2d 27 (1996):
"The work that lies ahead for both [adults] is not without
inconvenience and sacrifice on both sides. Their energies
should not be directed even partially at any continued rancor
at one another, but must be fully directed at developing
compassion and understanding for one another, as well as
showing love and sensitivity to the child[']s feelings at a
difficult time in all their lives."
Overfield, 199 W. Va. at 38, 483 S.E.2d at 38 (quoting Honaker, 182 W. Va. at 453, 388

24

Having resolved the case in this fashion, we need not address Tina B.'s
remaining assignments of error.
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S.E.2d at 326-27). This same wise counsel applies with equal force to the parties in this
case, Tina B. and Paul S. We only hope that they and their respective families can let
bygones be bygones and now interact amicably for the sake of Z.B.S.

IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the December 2, 2003, decision of the Circuit
Court of Clay County is hereby reversed.

Reversed.
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